Reputation-based threat protection

ABSTRACT

Information concerning a plurality of identified threats provided by a plurality of preselected sources is stored in memory. An e-mail message may be received over a communication network. The received e-mail message is separated into a plurality of components. The stored information is searched to identify a reputation score associated with each of the plurality of components. It is then determined whether the e-mail is a threat based on the identified reputation score of each of the plurality of components. The determination is sent to a designated recipient.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application is a continuation-in-part of U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 13/045,438 filed Mar. 10, 2011, which claims thepriority benefit of U.S. provisional patent application No. 61/312,474filed Mar. 10, 2010, the disclosures of which are incorporated herein byreference.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Field of the Invention

The present invention generally relates to threat protection. Morespecifically, the present invention relates to reputation-based threatprotection.

2. Description of the Related Art

Inbound spam volume continues to increase significantly, with no signsof abating. For example, in 2005, an average of 30 billion spam e-mailmessages were sent daily. By 2007, that average had quadrupled to 120billion daily spam messages. Assuming the effectiveness of a company'sspam filter had remained the same that equates to a four-fold increasein spam reaching inboxes over a two-year period.

The incentive driving this global spam industry is profit. Despite thecatastrophic impact on business productivity and network performance,and an increase in high-profile prosecutions of spammers, spam stillworks. Most spammers are salespeople who use unsolicited e-mail as anavenue to sell their products or services. Sending e-mail isinexpensive, and despite the general annoyance of spam messaging, somepeople do respond to spam advertisements. It this takes only a fewresponses for a spam ad to become profitable for the spammer. In onereported case, a spammer received only a 0.00036% response rate, but wasstill able to maintain a six-figure income by delivering tens ofmillions of e-mails a day. In another case, a one-month spam campaignfor an herbal supplement took in over half a million dollars in sales.As such, the idea behind spam is to reach as many people as possible toincrease the odds of finding even a few respondents. Spamming likewiseworks in the context of “pump and dump” stock schemes wherein spammersbuy stock, generate spam-bot mailing drives to pump up share volumes(and the corresponding price of the stock), and then dump the stock at aprofit.

Coordinated industry efforts to stem this ever-growing tide of spam haveseen relatively fleeting victories. In 2008, for instance, industrypressure led to the upstream disconnection of the Internet ServiceProvider (ISP) McColo, causing an instant worldwide drop in spam by asmuch as 75%. Spam operations merely relocated to other ISPs, however,and spam volumes quickly recovered to their earlier levels. Spammers areconstantly working to improve their effectiveness at getting past spamfilters. Spam is constantly getting more sophisticated because spammersare typically technically savvy and early adopters of innovativetechnology.

Examples of innovative technologies include the use botnets, which is acollection of compromised computer systems that are under a commoncontrol structure. The compromised systems, called “zombies,” can bedirected to send out spam, phishing messages, viruses, and othermalware. A computer can become a zombie through downloading a virus orTrojan in the form of executable attachments to e-mails and downloads onWeb. A spam attack of millions of spam messages can be sent using abotnet. Each zombie may only send out 1,000 messages for a given attack,but with 10,000 zombies in a botnet, that is 10 million messages.

E-mails sent from zombie machines can appear to originate from thevictim's computer and will steal computer resources to send the e-mails,which are often sent out en masse. These zombie machines can not onlyslow down network effectiveness, but also damage a company's reputationand require costly resources to purge the malicious code. Infectedcompanies, too, face being blacklisted by their ISPs and subsequentlyare unable to send e-mail. There are an estimated 70 Million to 150Million zombies active around the world. As many as 25% of computers onthe Internet are estimated to be infected with botnets or zombies.

Moreover, when a zombie sends out a spam e-mail, it does so from anassigned Internet address: the sender IP address. Many spam filters relyon the reputation associated with a legitimate sender IP to block spam.To lessen the effectiveness of systems which rely on sender IPreputation, spammers may “borrow” IP addresses with good, or at leastneutral, reputation. By limiting the number of spam messages a zombiesends, the spammer may be able to keep the IP address from getting a“bad” reputation.

Spammers may also buy access to a hacked e-mail server. The spammer maythen quickly generate a high number of spam messages using thereputation of the company whose server has been hacked. As with thezombie situation, a system on a particular company network may bepotentially compromising its sender IP reputation.

E-mail authentication tests the domain an e-mail says it is “from” todetermine if the message is really from the IP address of the sendinge-mail server. To work, it requires an organization to publish an SPFrecord, which tells e-mail receivers that a given IP address is allowedto send e-mail for a given domain. Strict set-up of an SPF record,however, means that third party services (e.g., an e-mail marketingcompany) typically cannot send e-mail on a company's behalf. As aconsequence, many companies set up authentication, but leave open theoption for other IP addresses to send e-mail (e.g., a third partymarketing company). Opening other IP addresses also opens the door forspammers. Moreover, spammers can register domain names and set them upto authenticate properly and then send e-mail from them.

Another spamming technique involves the use of “word salad,” which iswhen spammers add what appears to be random words to an e-mail message.The extra words to the e-mail are added to be read and evaluated by therecipients' spam filter. Generally, the extra words are considered“good” words (i.e., not typically found in a spam e-mail) according tomost spam filters. As such, when the message is evaluated, there are nowmore “good” words than “bad” words (e.g., “enhance” and “love life”). Ifthere are more good words than bad words, the spam filter may decide themessage is good. Similarly, some e-mail spam messages contain more thanextra words; they have entire sentences and paragraphs added to themessage. The idea is to add in “good” words and phrases to theevaluation and the use of complete sentences attempts to make it harderto exclude these “good” words from the evaluation of the messagecontent.

Generally, spam filters read e-mail looking for words and phrases itconsiders “bad” (i.e., indicative of spam) and if there is enough “bad”content, a message can be considered spam. A spammer may try to disguisethe bad words and phrases from the filter but still make them readableto the recipient, on the hope that the recipient will want what thespammer is selling. The spammer therefore changes the size of fonts,making extraneous letters “disappear” (e.g., too small to be legible tothe human eye) so that the recipient can easily read the message, whilethe spam filter sees only a line of gibberish.

Another strategy used by spammer is to use misspelled words in the hopesthat the spam filter will not be able to understand the words. Manylegitimate e-mails, however, may not necessarily use formal or correctspelling. Many people use slang, jargon, acronyms, abbreviations, andeven IM and text messaging terms.

Optical illusions are also common using tricks to disguise “bad” words.In this case, the spammer uses symbols, special characters, and evenalternate character sets to create the different variations. Using thismethod, it is estimated that there are over 600 quadrillion ways tospell “Viagra.” Writing separate rules for each variation would be anextremely difficult and time-consuming task. Alternatively, a spammermay use spam images rather than text. Even where spam filters canrecognize an image as being indicative of spam, the image may be alteredso that it may look the same to a reader, but are not actually the sameimage. Small changes make the images different.

More recently, spammers have focused their attention on IP addressreputation systems. As these types of systems have grown in popularity,spammers and hackers have increasingly focused their attacks oncompromising legitimate mail severs at companies with good reputations,and cracking Web mail accounts at ISPs, such as Yahoo or Gmail. Thisallows spammers to avoid traditional IP reputation systems by sendingbad mail from the servers of good businesses that have been compromised.Such tricks may cause spam to look and sound legitimate so the spam canget past the spam filter and into the recipient inbox. Because thesender is an actual person whose friends have likely whitelisted thatsender e-mail account, spam sent using that e-mail account is likely toget past a spam filter. In a related trick, spammers may use the latestheadlines as the e-mail subject. The headlines may not only addlegitimacy to the e-mail, but also often raises the recipient's interestin opening the e-mail.

Phishing scams pose another significant threat. Distinct from otherspam, phishing e-mails are specifically created to imitate legitimatee-mails, often copying actual corporate communication. Such phishinge-mails appear to be from a bank or other trusted source. The intent isto obtain account information related to financial accounts or otheridentity information. Billions of phishing e-mails are sent out everymonth, and these can lead to identity theft, security breaches, andfinancial loss and liability. Leveraging social engineering techniquesto evade corporate security systems, criminals gain network access andsteal confidential corporate data and financial assets. With theunwitting cooperation of an employee, network defenses such asfirewalls, Intrusion Detection and Prevention systems and secureidentification cards can become ineffective. Because phishing e-mailsare designed to look like legitimate business correspondence, theyconsistently elude standard spam filters, and e-mail policies alone arean insufficient defense. Phishing defense requires specific analysis,identification and handling.

Some attacks rely on misrepresenting the content of the message. In someinstances, spammers may attach real PDF or similar files to a messagethat contains the spam message. The actual e-mail body may say little,except perhaps something innocuous: “Joe, check this out” or “Q3 revenueforecast.” Similarly, backscatter or NDR (non-deliverable-return) spamare messages that look like returned e-mails that could not be deliveredto their intended sender. Spammers spoof such messages, attempting tobypass the e-mail security system.

Directory Harvest Attacks (DHAs) are exhaustive “brute force” attacks.DHAs bombard mail servers with e-mails sent to variations of possiblee-mail addresses to check which ones bounce and which are legitimate.The extensive volume of a DHA strains e-mail infrastructures. Inaddition, DHAs acquire information on e-mail addresses for the companyto be used later in follow-up, targeted spam, virus and phishingattacks. Similarly, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are maliciousattempts to bring down e-mail infrastructures. By sending an enormousvolume of e-mail traffic into an organization at a coordinated time,attackers attempt to overwhelm the network and e-mail infrastructure,bringing e-mail to a complete stop.

Spammers will continually attempt to plague e-mail inboxes until it isno longer profitable for the spammer or there is a hack-proof preventionmethod that everyone uses. There is no singular technology that can stopall spam, and history has shown that when a given technology begins towork well, spammers attack it with a vengeance. Meanwhile, ITdepartments are left with having to allocate more resources to clean outswamped mailboxes, maintain key business communications and undo thedamage done by newly emerging e-mail-borne threats.

Outbound threats are also becoming a top priority for IT administratorsand CEOs, based upon fears of regulatory non-compliance and the leakageof sensitive intellectual property or confidential information. Allorganizations are faced with the challenge of meeting e-mail compliancerequirements, whether regulatory compliance from government legislation,such as HIPAA, GLBA, or SOX; industry standards; or corporatecompliance, such as preventing offensive e-mails or protectingintellectual property. Data leaks are not limited to malicious acts;most confidential data leaks are likely due to employee carelessness.With these various compliance requirements, encryption and archivingoptions alone are not enough. Organizations must have robust policymanagement and enforcement options to meet the range of complianceneeds.

One recently adopted industry approach to anti-spam is SenderIdentification (Sender ID). This technique authenticates the IP addressof an external e-mail server that is making an inbound connection to thenetwork to see if it matches the domain name of the e-mail sender. Thisassumes the sender has published a Sender Policy Framework (SPF) recordand that the record is correctly set-up. There are two primary issueswith this technique. First, spammers can create valid SPF records.Second, most companies do not like the restrictions Sender ID placestheir ability to have e-mail sent on their behalf. For example, using athird-party vendor to send e-mail messages to customers could cause anSPF failure.

Another inbound technique often attacked by spammers is Bayesian contentanalysis, which infers the probability of an e-mail being spam basedupon combinations of specific individual words. Bayesian analysis can bea very powerful, but in practice, there is no universal definition forspam content, as each person has a different degree of tolerance andcuriosity. Some companies try to train a Bayesian filter based on anorganization's e-mail. This opens the door to Bayesian poisoning attackby spammers who place “good” content in spam messages in an attempt toskew the Bayesian scoring system. So while Bayesian content analysis isan excellent technique, by itself, it may not be able to meet thechallenge of defending against today's pervasive spammers.

It is just as important to monitor and control outbound e-mail asinbound e-mail. Unfortunately, many small and midsize businesses chooseto forego deploying outbound e-mail protection. This carries with it thehighest risk of compromise of private or proprietary information. Tolower that risk, many organizations have established and communicatedwritten e-mail usage policies. While these written policies are a stepin the right direction, best practice is to automatically analyze andenforce outbound e-mail polices in order to ensure compliance withinternal and external regulations.

Over the years, spam has evolved from an annoyance to a serious threatto productivity and security. Inbound and outbound e-mail threatscontinue to proliferate at exponential rates. Simultaneously,e-mail-borne threats are also becoming more advanced. Increasingly,these more advanced threats blend spam, phishing, spyware, viruses,Trojans and other malware, into sophisticated blended attacks. As spamhas evolved, traditional anti-spam systems have correspondingly evolvedinto more powerful and comprehensive e-mail security solutions.

The nature of spam is changing, incorporating a wide spectrum ofe-mail-borne attacks that can stifle productivity, infect corporatenetworks and undermine corporate reputation and regularity compliance.In response, the nature of anti-spam defense is changing as well.Presently available single-point (single-technology) analytic solutionsmay not be sufficient to counter the constantly morphing forms of spam.Even multiple techniques, if they are not updated regularly, are notenough to keep spam at bay for long. Moreover, rigid scoring often endsup blocking e-mail that users actually want to receive. E-mail securitysolutions now require a sophisticated blend of technologies focused onboth inbound and outbound protection.

There is, therefore, a need for improved systems and methods for threatprotection from spam.

SUMMARY OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION

Embodiments of the present invention include systems and methods forreputation-based threat protection. Information concerning a pluralityof identified threats provided by a plurality of preselected sources isstored in memory. An e-mail message may be received over a communicationnetwork. The received e-mail message is separated into a plurality ofcomponents. The stored information is searched to identify a reputationscore associated with each of the plurality of components. It is thendetermined whether the e-mail is a threat based on the identifiedreputation score of each of the plurality of components. Thedetermination is sent to a designated recipient.

Various embodiments of the present invention include methods forreputation-based threat protection. Such methods include maintaininginformation provided by a plurality of preselected sources in memoryconcerning a plurality of identified threats, receiving an e-mailmessage over a communication network, executing instructions stored inmemory, wherein execution of the instructions by a processor separatesthe received e-mail message into a plurality of components, searches themaintained information to identify a reputation score associated witheach of the plurality of components, and determines whether the e-mailis a threat based on the identified reputation score of each of theplurality of components and sending information to a designatedrecipient regarding the determination whether the e-mail is a threat,the information being sent over the communication network.

Other embodiments of the present invention include non-transitorycomputer-readable storage media on which is embodied instructionsexecutable to perform a method for reputation-based threat protection ingeneral accordance with the method previously set forth above.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary network environment in which a systemfor providing dynamic redemption codes may be implemented.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary method for providingdynamic redemption codes.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Embodiments of the present invention provide reputation-based threatprotection. Information concerning a plurality of identified threatsprovided by a plurality of preselected sources is stored in memory. Ane-mail message may be received over a communication network. Thereceived e-mail message is separated into a plurality of components. Thestored information is searched to identify a reputation score associatedwith each of the plurality of components. It is then determined whetherthe e-mail is a threat based on the identified reputation score of eachof the plurality of components. The determination is sent to adesignated recipient.

Anti-spam techniques generally break down into two groups: 1. reputationanalysis and 2. content analysis. Reputation analysis is examining thereputation of many e-mail attributes, including the Sender IP Address,the content, the links/URLs, images, attachments, the e-mail's structureand more. Content analysis includes such techniques like Bayesianfiltering, lexicographical distancing and image inference analysis,along with simpler checks like allow/block lists and SPF checks, arecombined to thoroughly analyze an e-mail and dig out its true purpose.

FIG. 1 illustrates an exemplary network environment 100 in which asystem for reputation-based threat protection may be implemented. Innetwork environment 100, one or more user devices 120A-B may be incommunication with a server 130, via a communication network 110. Server130 may also be in communication with one or more threat databases 140.In addition, one or more sources 150A-C may also communicate with theother devices in network environment 100 via communications network 110.

Communication network 110 may be a local, proprietary network (e.g., anintranet) and/or may be a part of a larger wide-area network. Thecommunications network 110 may be a local area network (LAN), which maybe communicatively coupled to a wide area network (WAN) such as theInternet. The Internet is a broad network of interconnected computersand servers allowing for the transmission and exchange of InternetProtocol (IP) data between users connected through a network serviceprovider. Examples of network service providers are the public switchedtelephone network, a cable service provider, a provider of digitalsubscriber line (DSL) services, or a satellite service provider.Communications network 110 allows for communication between the variouscomponents of environment 100.

Users may use any number of different electronic user devices 120, suchas a general-purpose computer, portable computing devices (e.g., laptop,netbook, tablets), desktop computing devices, mobile phones,smartphones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), or any other type ofcomputing device capable of communicating over communication network110. Each user device 120 may also be configured to access data fromother storage media, such as memory cards or disk drives as may beappropriate in the case of downloaded content. User device 120 mayinclude standard computing components such as network and mediainterfaces, non-transitory computer-readable storage (memory), andprocessors for executing instructions that may be stored in memory.

Server 130 can receive and process communications sent by user devices120A-B. Server 130 may include any computing device as is known in theart, including standard computing components such as network and mediainterfaces, non-transitory computer-readable storage (memory), andprocessors for executing instructions or accessing information that maybe stored in memory. The functionalities of multiple servers may beintegrated into a single server. Any of the aforementioned servers (oran integrated server) may take on certain client-side, cache, or proxyserver characteristics. These characteristics may depend on theparticular network placement of the server or certain configurations ofthe server.

Server 130 may also intercept and review e-mail sent by or to userdevices 120A-B. Before the e-mail server is sent onto its destination,server 130 may evaluate the e-mail to determine whether it is spam orother unwanted e-mail (e.g., infected with virus, phishing). Forexample, user device 120A may wish to send e-mail to user device 120B.Server 130 may intercept the e-mail and evaluate it before allowing itto be sent to user device 120B. To facilitate the evaluation of thee-mail, server 130 of FIG. 1 may consult with a threat database 140.Databases 140 may be local or remote to the server 130. Further, theinformation in threat databases 140 may also be stored separately indifferent databases (e.g., based on type of threat) or aggregated in onedatabase as illustrated in FIG. 1. Server 130 can access the stored datain the threat databases 140 and use that data, or information derivedfrom or related to the same, to evaluate the e-mail. Conversely, theserver 130 may receive information from user devices 120A-B or sources150A-C and store the same in threat database 140. The server 130 canlater access data stored in any of database 140 for various purposesincluding evaluating subsequent e-mails.

Upon receiving an e-mail for evaluation, server 130 may separate thee-mail into components. For example, components of an e-mail may includemetadata, such as sender e-mail address or IP address, and content fromthe e-mail (e.g., text, images, attachments). Moreover, components mayalso include different combinations of content. Each component mayfurther be processed (e.g., to create a signature (e.g., thumbprint).Such thumbprints may not only include current reputation information onSender IP addresses, but also all significant components of the message,including message structure, content, embedded URLs, images, attachmentsand other factors. Server 130 may determine, based on such thumbprintinformation in threat database 140, what reputation score is associatedwith each of the components. Based on the combination of reputationscores for each of the components of the e-mail, server 130 maydetermine whether the e-mail represents a threat.

Threat database 140 may include information related to e-mails that werepreviously identified as threats. Any type of e-mail information may bestored in threat database 140, including any component that can beextracted from an e-mail message. Moreover, each component may beassociated with a unique thumbprint for easy identification. Suchthumbprint may be generated by hashing, or any equivalent process forproducing unique identifiers. Each component is further associated witha reputation score. The reputation score may have accumulated oraggregated over time based on votes from preselected sources. Thepreselected sources include trusted businesses, partners, or experts whohave evaluated previous e-mails and identified such e-mails as spam. Thecomponents of each e-mail (and associated thumbprints) may then beassociated with a vote for spam. In some embodiments, a source 150 maybe limited to one vote per thumbprint per day. Sources 150A-C may alsovote anonymously in some instances.

Sources 150A-C may be associated with any trusted users, clients, “honeypots” (i.e., e-mail addresses and domains placed throughout the internetworldwide to collect spam, phishing and virus e-mails), real-timeblacklists (RBL) providers, Web rating analysts (e.g., SonicLabs),individual contributing industry professionals, security/spamspecialists, or any party designated as being trusted to provideaccurate characterization of spam. These sources 150A-C collect,identify, define and transmit information on multiple vector componentsto server 130 for compilation and analysis, applying unique processesand criteria. Sources 150A-C may be similar to user device 120 withrespect to such standard computing components such as network and mediainterfaces, non-transitory computer-readable storage (memory), andprocessors for executing instructions that may be stored in memory.Sources 150A-C allows a trusted entity to communicate informationregarding spam messages that may be used to further evaluate subsequente-mail messages.

Server 130 may therefore collaboratively gather, analyze and vetcross-vector threat information from millions of business-orientedsources around the world. Reputation based threat protection informationis then distributed securely, anonymously and in real time to improvethe overall effectiveness of e-mail security solutions. Due to thedistributed nature of this network and the use of multiple differentdata sources, the evaluation from on contributor can be vetted againstmultiple other contributors, allowing collaborative filtering process tobe highly accurate and fully self-correcting.

Such collaborative filtering avoids having to rely upon rented orpurchased lists from Internet Service Providers (ISPs). As such,dynamically up-to-date e-mail component reputation analysis contributeto and take advantage of global threat monitoring information, in orderto provide users 120A-B with comprehensive and responsive securitysolutions.

Historically, security solutions have often grouped threats by vectorscorresponding to particular ports by which suspect traffic might breachthe network perimeter (e.g., the e-mail vector would relate to trafficover Port 25, the Web vector to traffic over Port 80). Server 130,however, may collect, analyze, and distribute “cross-vector”threat-related information between security systems, to enable a moreintelligently collaborative and comprehensive response. For instance, ane-mail message might contain a URL that has been defined as suspect.Using a cross-vector approach, server 130 can block browser access tothe URL over Port 80 on the Web vector, as well as blocking access tothe message over Port 25 on the e-mail vector. Each component of avector can receive independent analysis and filtering. For example, asingle e-mail message could be broken down into the components ofsending IP address, text content, e-mail structure, URL links, fileattachments, embedded images. Individually, any of these componentsmight be a recognized as a threat, and considered to have a “good” or“bad” reputation.

The GRID Network creates reputation scores for vector components throughcollaborative filtering. Collaborative filtering refers generally to theprocess by which a community made up of multiple business-focusedsources shares information on identified threats, in order tocollaboratively define suspect vector components that should be blockedor filtered. In the case of e-mail security, the reputation ofcomponents may be determined through the compilation and weighting ofjunk and unjunk “votes.” When an e-mail is disassembled, each componentmay be encrypted using a non-reversible hash process to create a“thumbprint” of that component. These thumbprints may then sent be tothe data center with a corresponding reputation of good or bad, andtabulated in real time. Every transmission may be encoded over HTTPS,using the DES/AES encryption of the browser. Each user or source mayonly be allowed to submit one vote per thumbprint per day forconsideration. For example, if the same URL is determined to be bad byan Anti-Spam Desktop user in New York and another Anti-Spam Desktop userin Beijing, each user anonymously may enters a single individual vote.This prohibits spammers from “gaming” the system and keeps inputs fromany system from skewing the reputation scores.

Votes may be tallied in a data sequencing process at server 130, wherethey are compiled and vetted against votes from all other sources150A-C. At any given time, there may be millions of thumbprints in thethreat database 140 compiled with collaboration from millions of sources150A-C. Server 130 may gather and vet millions of e-mails per day from“honey pots” designed as bait e-mail addresses or domains for spam andphishing attacks. Server 130 may disassemble these collected “honey pot”e-mails into constituent thumbprints, and adds them as junk votes.Server 130 may also use information provided by real-time blacklistproviders and individual industry professionals to contribute to thereputation vetting process. Server 130 may further provide ambiguouse-mails for further evaluation by analysts to add an additional layer ofchecks-and-balances.

When an e-mail is received by server 130, one of the checks may be tobreak down the e-mail into its component parts (e.g., and/or generatethumbprints thereof) and to determine the reputation of each componentfrom the threat database 140. If one or more components are flagged asjunk, the e-mail may be identified as having a reputation of junk. Tokeep the threat database 150 current, updates (e.g., from sources150A-C) may be received and automatically applied periodically. Theseupdates allow for maximization of collaborative power with minimaladministration.

Collaborative filtering further incorporates a self-correcting humanelement. For example, server 130 may recognize that a particular IPaddress has transmitted a spam e-mail. However, the sender of the e-mailfrom that IP address may be known to a source 150A-C as legitimate, andhaving a good reputation. By vetting the evaluation from one source150A-C against evaluations from multiple other sources 150A-C regardingthis particular IP address and sender, a broader statistical sample maybe established, and a more accurate reputation score can be determined.This comprehensive vetting process may be applied not only to IPaddresses, but to all thumbprint types.

Relying upon rented or purchased lists from consumer-based InternetService Providers (ISPs) may have limited value, as such lists may beeasily “gamed” and as such, may not be as accurate as opinions fromsources 150A-C that may be selected based on expertise and accuracy. Inaddition, active mechanisms for tracking and responding to virus- andspyware-related information may be included. Using thedynamically-updated threat database 140 and its extensive list ofmalware thumbprints, most common threats may be automatically blocked.As such, users may be prevented from downloading e-mail containingspyware and stops any existing spyware from being disseminated viae-mail systems. Such functions can be further augmented by optionalanti-virus subscriptions and subscriptions for continual signatureupdates (e.g., from McAfee and Kaspersky Lab). Subscription informationmay be automatically distributed, along with internally-definedthumbprints, at periodic intervals of time. In addition to informationregarding spam and viruses, URLs of suspect Web sites may also betracked in threat database 140.

In some instances, server 130 may conduct deep packet inspection (DPI)on a packet received from a particular IP address to determine whetherthat packet contains a virus. Potentially, that information couldcontribute to the reputation of that IP address. Likewise, server 130may be useful in identifying suspect distribution patterns that could beused in tracking and blocking sophisticated, automated multi-prongattacks. Server 130 may scan content in every significant e-mailcomponent (body, subject, attachments) to assure compliance withcorporate policy, and can block or re-route non-compliant e-mails toappropriate LDAP-based groups or individuals. Scanning content mayutilize any adversarial Bayesian analysis including advanced text andimage parsing engines, lexicographical distancing, image analysis (e.g.,white-on-white, teeny fonts), gibberish detection, and corporate or userallow/block lists. Bayesian fraud content analysis may also be used todifferentiate and isolate phishing fraud from spam during the filteringprocess.

Using the dynamically updated threat database 140 and its extensive listof signatures/thumbprints, threats, as well as time-zero attacks, may beprevented. Users may also be prevented from downloading spyware andstops any existing spyware from being disseminated via e-mail systems.Robust anti-zombie defense may be provided through identifying andblocking zombie-generated e-mail and alerting the administrator topotentially infected machines. A multiple-diagnostic approach, combinedwith flexible response options, may enable enterprises to prevent zombiedamage while allowing the company to send legitimate outgoing e-mails.Zombie detection may employ multiple indicators to locate thesedangerous machines and stop the transmission of e-mail threats. Theseindicators include machines sending out spam, phishing or virus e-mails;e-mails sent from addresses not in the company's LDAP address list; andhigh e-mail volumes sent from individuals or corporate-wide. Theadministrator can select how to respond to actions flagged as zombiemachine indicators. For example, the e-mail messages can be deleted orquarantined, or an alert can be sent to a designated recipient. If“Outbound Safe Mode” is initiated, alerts may be sent at periodicintervals, dangerous attachments may be prevented from being sent, andoutbound messages with potentially dangerous attachments (e.g.,executable program files) may be optionally deleted or quarantined.

In addition to the signatures/thumbprints in threat database 140, server130 may further utilize a policy engine and compliance services toidentify, route and report on compliance-related information entering orleaving the organization via e-mail. Such services may includecompliance dictionaries, record-ID matching, compliance reports,archiving, encryption, and approval boxes with alerts. Record-IDmatching searches for predefined patterns (e.g., social securitynumbers, bank routing numbers, credit card numbers) for easy-to-useWeb-based, UI-enabled custom record searches. Attachment scanning looksfor content within attachments (e.g., Word, PowerPoint, PDF and over 300other file types) to ensure sensitive data does not leave withinattachments. Predefined policies provides common compliance setups.Predefined Dictionaries help in handling health or financial records tomonitor for regulatory (e.g., HIPAA, SOX, GLBA) violations and, used inconjunction with record ID matching, ensure the protection ofconfidential information and prevention of sensitive data leaks.Approval boxes allow viewing and approval of e-mails that potentiallyviolate compliance policies before they leave the organization. E-mailarchiving is available for both inbound and outbound e-mail traffic onthe same server or appliance. Additionally, organizations can routee-mails that match a specific policy to an external archive. Encryptionrouting directs e-mails that match a specific policy to anencryption/decryption server. Coupled with Transport Layer Security(TLS), a free standards-based gateway-to-gateway encryption protocol,secure communication of confidential information may be ensured. Assuch, organizations may be able to meet both external (e.g., PCI, SOX,HIPAA) and internal (e.g., intellectual property policy) needs andrequirements. Server 130 may therefore be able to intelligently monitorfor compliance, identify e-mails that violate compliance policies,applying multiple enforcement actions, and report on the same.

Based on evaluation of e-mail, server 130 may initiate a variety ofcorresponding actions (e.g., bounce, route to, notify). These policiescan be applied company-wide or to specific users or LDAP-based groups.Administrators can then monitor the impact of a particular policy byplacing all e-mails that match the policy in a named Approval Box forreview. In some embodiments, users are provided with a single e-mailthat summarizes all of their quarantined spam, virus and phishinge-mails. That e-mail may also includes single-click access to “unjunk”message types permitted by IT, delivering them to the employee's inbox,and allowing the senders to be added to the user's personal allowedlist. This summary e-mail ensures that employees never miss a legitimatemessage and never need to contact IT to find the message. Users canpreview messages in “safe mode,” which can prevents the user from seeingoffensive content and prevent the execution of Java, JavaScript or anyother potentially malicious code. Users may also be provided a personaljunk box, which they can access through a simple Web interface. Fromhere, users can search, sort, and review e-mail determined to be junk.Then, with a single-click of the “unjunk” option, users can have maildelivered seamlessly to their inbox and have the sender added to theirpersonal allowed list. The junk box itself may be kept at the perimeter(e.g., off the e-mail server), thereby decreasing risk and load. Anadministrator can also enable end-user access to a junk-button fore-mail client (e.g., Outlook) plug-in. If allowed, a user can downloadthis lightweight plug-in and install it on their user device. The junkbutton will display whenever the e-mail client is running and, whenused, will not only remove the selected spam message from the user'sinbox, but also send the user's “junk” vote immediately and anonymouslyfor storage in the threat database 140, collaborating in aglobal-community-based solution to stopping spam.

In any notification to administrators, server 130 may provideclarification as to categorization actions to explain why a specificmessage was classified as spam, likely spam or non-spam. This featureallows administrators to fine-tune their system to block spam whileminimizing false positives. In the rare case of a false positive orfalse negative, the administrator can use the information provided byserver in the notification to determine why a specific e-mail was or wasnot blocked.

Multi-LDAP and user list support may also be provided as a flexiblesolution for distributed organizations or managed service providers(MSPS). These types of deployments typically need to connect to multipleLDAP servers, or have a User List of valid users for a given domainwhere LDAP services are not available. Dynamic synchronization withexisting LDAP servers may ensure any modifications made byadministrators are automatically reflected in filtering activity in realtime. Synchronization may be enabled with nearly any corporatedirectory, including Exchange 5.5, Active Directory, Lotus, iPlanet andOpenLDAP.

FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary method 200 for providingreputation-based threat protection. The method 200 of FIG. 2 may beembodied as executable instructions embodied in a computer readablestorage medium including but not limited to a CD, DVD, or non-volatilememory such as a hard drive. The instructions of the storage medium maybe executed by a processor (or processors) to cause various hardwarecomponents of a computing device hosting or otherwise accessing thestorage medium to effectuate the method. The steps identified in FIG. 2(and the order thereof) are exemplary and may include variousalternatives, equivalents, or derivations thereof including but notlimited to the order of execution of the same.

In method 200 as illustrated in FIG. 2, information is stored regardinga plurality of identified threats. The maintained information wasprovided by a plurality of preselected sources. An e-mail message isreceived over a communication network. The received e-mail message isseparated into a plurality of components. The maintained information issearched to identify a reputation score associated with each of theplurality of components. It is determined whether the e-mail is a threatbased on the identified reputation score of each of the plurality ofcomponents, and information is sent to a designated recipient regardingthe determination whether the e-mail is a threat.

In step 210, information is maintained in threat database 140. Threatdatabases 140 may encompass one or multiple databases for storinginformation regarding e-mail and e-mail threats (e.g., spam, phishinge-mails, viruses/malware, noncompliant e-mails). Such information mayinclude reputation scores, which may be based on votes provided by anyof the sources 150A-C that have been preselected based on such factorsas expertise and accuracy. Threat databases 140 may collectively serveas a repository for information used to identify e-mail threats.

In step 220, an e-mail message is received over communication network110. Specifically, a sender user device (e.g., user device 120A) maysend an e-mail message addressed to a recipient. The e-mail message isintercepted and received at server 130, however, for evaluation beforebeing allowed to be sent to the recipient.

In step 230, the received e-mail is separated into components. Server130 reviews the contents of intercepted e-mail message and breaks thecontents down into various components. A message body, for example, mayinclude text and images. The text may be broken down into anycombination of words or parts of words. Similarly, the image may bebroken down into smaller groups of pixels. Other parts of the messagemay be broken down similarly, including metadata, sender information,and/or recipient information.

In step 240, a reputation score is identified for each component. Server130 consults threat database 140 and determines whether each componentexists in threat database 140. Further, if a component does exist inthreat database 140, that component may be associated with a reputationscore. If a particular component does not exist in threat database 140,it may be added and assigned a reputation score. The assigned reputationscore may be based on evaluating the reputation scores of the othercomponents in the same message.

In step 250, it is determined whether the e-mail is a threat. Server 130has identified a reputation score for each component in the message thatexists in threat database 140. For example, a message may have beenbroken down into 100 components including text components, imagecomponents, metadata components, and address components. There may be 90components that have a reputation score indicative of spam, 5 componentsthat have a reputation score that is not indicative of spam, and 5components that do not exist in threat database 140. Based on suchscoring, server 130 may determine that the e-mail is indeed a threat. Insome instances, the 5 components that do not exist in the threatdatabase may be assigned a reputation score that is also indicative ofspam (e.g., an average of the reputation scores of the other 95components).

In step 260, information regarding the determination is sent to adesignated recipient. In some embodiments, the designated recipient maybe a system administrator tasked with following up regarding furtheranalysis or activity. For example, the administrator may need toevaluate the sender device to see whether it has been hacked or become azombie device.

Non-transitory computer-readable storage media refer to any medium ormedia that participate in providing instructions to a central processingunit (CPU) for execution. Such media can take many forms, including, butnot limited to, non-volatile and volatile media such as optical ormagnetic disks and dynamic memory, respectively. Common forms ofnon-transitory computer-readable media include, for example, a floppydisk, a flexible disk, a hard disk, magnetic tape, any other magneticmedium, a CD-ROM disk, digital video disk (DVD), any other opticalmedium, RAM, PROM, EPROM, a FLASHEPROM, and any other memory chip orcartridge.

Various forms of transmission media may be involved in carrying one ormore sequences of one or more instructions to a CPU for execution. A buscarries the data to system RAM, from which a CPU retrieves and executesthe instructions. The instructions received by system RAM can optionallybe stored on a fixed disk either before or after execution by a CPU.Various forms of storage may likewise be implemented as well as thenecessary network interfaces and network topologies to implement thesame.

While various embodiments have been described above, it should beunderstood that they have been presented by way of example only, and notlimitation. The descriptions are not intended to limit the scope of theinvention to the particular forms set forth herein. Thus, the breadthand scope of a preferred embodiment should not be limited by any of theabove-described exemplary embodiments. It should be understood that theabove description is illustrative and not restrictive. To the contrary,the present descriptions are intended to cover such alternatives,modifications, and equivalents as may be included within the spirit andscope of the invention as defined by the appended claims and otherwiseappreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art. The scope of theinvention should, therefore, be determined not with reference to theabove description, but instead should be determined with reference tothe appended claims along with their full scope of equivalents.

1. A method for reputation based threat protection, the methodcomprising: maintaining information in memory concerning a plurality ofidentified threats, the maintained information provided by a pluralityof preselected sources; receiving an e-mail message over a communicationnetwork; executing instructions stored in memory, wherein execution ofthe instructions by a processor: separates the received e-mail messageinto a plurality of components, searches the maintained information toidentify a reputation score associated with each of the plurality ofcomponents, and determines that the e-mail is a threat based on theidentified reputation score of each of the plurality of components; andsending information to a designated recipient regarding thedetermination that the e-mail is a threat, the information being sentover the communication network.
 2. The method of claim 1, furthercomprising generating a thumbprint for each of the plurality ofcomponents.
 3. The method of claim 2, wherein each of the preselectedsources is allowed one vote per thumbprint per day.
 4. The method ofclaim 3, wherein the reputation score for each of the plurality ofcomponents is based on a collection of votes from the preselectedsources.
 5. The method of claim 1, further comprising: identifying asender of the e-mail message determined to be a threat; and sending analert regarding the identified sender.
 6. The method of claim 5, furthercomprising locating the sender device, wherein the sender device isplaced in safe mode.
 7. The method of claim 6, wherein an outgoinge-mail sent by the sender device placed in safe mode is quarantined foranalysis before being allowed to be delivered to a recipient.
 8. Themethod of claim 7, wherein analysis includes permitting the sender toreview the quarantined message and information regarding thedetermination that the e-mail message is a threat.
 9. The method ofclaim 8, wherein content in the quarantined message is blocked fromdisplay.
 10. The method of claim 7, wherein analysis includes permittingthe recipient to review the quarantined message and informationregarding the determination that the e-mail message is a threat.
 11. Themethod of claim 10, wherein content in the quarantined message isblocked from display.
 12. A non-transitory computer-readable storagemedium, having embodied thereon a program executable by a processor toperform a method for reputation based threat protection, the methodcomprising: maintaining information concerning a plurality of identifiedthreats, the maintained information provided by a plurality ofpreselected sources; receiving an e-mail message; separating thereceived e-mail message into a plurality of components; searching themaintained information to identify a reputation score associated witheach of the plurality of components; determining that the e-mail is athreat based on the identified reputation score of each of the pluralityof components; and sending information to a designated recipientregarding the determination that the e-mail is a threat.
 13. Thenon-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 12, the programfurther executable to generate a thumbprint for each of the plurality ofcomponents.
 14. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium ofclaim 13, wherein each of the preselected sources is allowed one voteper thumbprint per day.
 15. The non-transitory computer-readable storagemedium of claim 14, wherein the reputation score for each of theplurality of components is based on a collection of votes from thepreselected sources.
 16. The non-transitory computer-readable storagemedium of claim 12, and the program further executable to: identify asender of the e-mail message determined to be a threat; and send analert regarding the identified sender.
 17. The non-transitorycomputer-readable storage medium of claim 16, the program furtherexecutable to locate the sender device, wherein the sender device isplaced in safe mode.
 18. The non-transitory computer-readable storagemedium of claim 17, wherein an outgoing e-mail sent by the sender deviceplaced in safe mode is quarantined for analysis before being allowed tobe delivered to a recipient.
 19. The non-transitory computer-readablestorage medium of claim 18, wherein analysis includes permitting thesender to review the quarantined message and information regarding thedetermination that the e-mail message is a threat.